Neighbouring in Anxiety along the China-Vietnam Border by Zhang, Juan
                          Zhang, J. (2016). Neighbouring in Anxiety along the China-Vietnam
Border. In M. Saxer, & J. Zhang (Eds.), The Art of Neighbouring:
Making Relations Across China’s Borders (pp. 203-222). University of
Amsterdam Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048532629-012
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY-NC
Link to published version (if available):
10.1515/9789048532629-012
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Amsterdam
University Press at https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9789048532629-012/html . Please refer to
any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/




In the early morning of November 30th, 2007, a dozen Chinese trucks lined up 
at the Hekou-Lao Cai border gate and blocked the bustling traff ic. Around 
these trucks, a small crowd of Chinese traders and drivers congregated 
in dismay, complaining loudly about unfairness and injustice. It was the 
off icial opening day of the seventh Annual China-Vietnam Border Trade 
Fair (Zhong-Yue bianjing jingji maoyi jiaoyihui中越边境经济贸易交易会; 
hereafter the Trade Fair). Under the red banners that proudly announced 
the success of the Trade Fair, Chinese grievances and disappointment were 
growing. These trucks, fully loaded with various kinds of merchandise, had 
attempted to cross the border to reach the Trade Fair’s venue in Lao Cai. As 
they proceeded with customs clearance, to their surprise, they were told by 
the Lao Cai Customs Off ice to pay additional tariff by 60 to 140 percent on 
almost all their commodities, despite the fact that a special duty-free policy 
was in place for the Trade Fair, which had been the case for the past six years.
At f irst, Chinese traders, many of whom came from faraway places in 
Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, and Sichuan, regarded the unexpected tariff-
ing at the border gate as a mistake of some kind. They reasoned and explained, 
trying to make the Vietnamese officials understand that the commodities 
were specif ically for the Trade Fair. Pretty soon they realized that their 
reasoning and pleas were useless. Unable to cross the border without paying, 
unwilling to go back empty-handed, the Chinese traders were fuming with 
anger and felt cheated. A few Yunnanese traders were among the loudest; they 
decided to lead the pack back to the Chinese side of the border and protested 
in front of the Hekou Entry and Exit Inspection Center. They demanded to 
see Chinese officials immediately for explanations and solutions.
* The ethnographic materials used in this chapter are drawn from my 12-month f ieldwork 
in Hekou and Lao Cai in 2007, and a short one-month f ieldtrip in 2012. Pseudonyms are used 
throughout this chapter. I acknowledge with much gratitude the generous support by the 
University of New England, Australia, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 
and Macquarie University, Australia for f ieldwork and writing. 
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This incident reveals the inherently precarious nature of the seemingly 
benign undertaking of ‘neighbouring’. Through this incident, this chapter 
zooms in onto a particular moment in contemporary neighbouring rela-
tions when neighbourly intimacy is def ined by cooperation and mutual 
interest as much as lurking crises and anxieties. To be one’s neighbour 
is to enter into the intimate realm of contact and to be confronted by its 
vicissitudes. Focusing primarily on the Chinese practice of neighbourly 
unease, this chapter offers reflections on how apprehensions and anxieties 
are constitutive forces in the agonistic intimacy of neighbouring. With this 
Trade Fair incident, this chapter shows that at the moment of acute anxiety, 
a stronger motivation to strengthen the façade of ‘neighbourly harmony’ 
rises. Everyday trade relations, in particular, are sustained by Chinese and 
Vietnamese partners in practice – not in spite of anxieties but, in fact, are 
motivated by anxieties. Just as Franck Billé’s description (Chapter 1, this 
volume) of the envious gazes between the Russian and Chinese neighbours 
across the Amur River as both motivating and unsettling, the moving force 
of neighbourly unease at the China-Vietnam border keeps cordial gestures 
and productive practices in play. ‘Neighbourly harmony’ is inherently fragile 
and volatile. It is a constant practice and is in perpetual need of construction 
and reinforcement.
Through the drama of the failed yet ‘successful’ (as the off icial news 
proclaimed) Trade Fair, this chapter examines the intricate ways in which 
Chinese traders manage daily affairs with their Vietnamese neighbours, 
accompanied by a particular sense of unease of their encounters. This unease 
is at once a recognition of the unpredictability of dealing with close neigh-
bours. It is also a performative and rhetorical strategy to ensure that surface 
harmony is maintained, and cooperation on a day-to-day basis is upheld. 
Through traders’ discourses of suspicion and distrust, this chapter explores 
the constructive force of anxieties that impels compromises, negotiations, 
ceremonial rituals, staging of friendship, and performances of cooperation.
I locate this neighbourly unease within the dynamic processes of China 
and Vietnam’s reform and opening since the 1980s. At the China-Vietnam 
border, drastic transformations took place after the brutal 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese Border War (hereafter the border war) and the subsequent 
political stalemate. This borderland was heavily militarized and the border 
remained shut for a whole decade.1 Starting from the early 1990s, while 
the border zone was still mired in restrictions and dangers, a few traders 
1 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the Sino-Vietnamese Border War in 1979, 
its causes and consequences. For details, see for example Li (2007) and Tretiak (1979).
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started to explore the untapped trans-border marketplace with bartering 
and small-scale trade. The consequence of the border war seemed to have 
little effect on the nascent border trade, as borderlanders soon learned to 
call their neighbours ‘friends’ and ‘partners’, rather than ‘enemies’. Veteran 
soldiers cast off their military uniforms and changed into business suits. 
Peasants who escaped the war had returned to their bombed down homes to 
start small businesses. Within a short span of 20 years, the China-Vietnam 
border turned from one of the most restrictive zones of closure to a pros-
perous special economic zone of trade and leisure. This once contested 
border zone has now become a showcase for trans-border development, 
entrepreneurship, consumption and desire.
In what follows, I will f irst present briefly the recent history of violence 
and peace at the borderland and show that the inherent sense of conflict and 
distrust underpins contemporary efforts of peace and friendship. This is not 
to suggest that these efforts are dishonest in any way; in fact, because the 
conflicts and distrust are all too real, people have learned to be more cau-
tious and cordial in order to make friendship work. I relate contemporary 
neighbourly anxieties to historical relations of power between China and 
its near neighbour where elaborate ceremonies of goodwill were sometimes 
spurred by insecurities and embarrassment. It shows that neighbourly 
gestures are performed most ceremoniously when tensions arise. I then 
describe the Trade Fair incident in detail and elaborate on the ‘intimate 
insults’ (Das 2007), stereotyping and jokes that Chinese traders used to 
belittle their Vietnamese neighbours. This practice revealed deep seated 
feelings of distrust, insecurity, and to a certain extent helplessness the 
Chinese experienced when trading with their neighbours – policies can 
change without notice, market competitions grow f ierce, trading partners 
turn out to have little loyalty, prof it margins become slim. While most of 
their frustrations have more to do with conflicts between government 
and business, Chinese at the border f ind fault with ordinary Vietnamese 
who may be also suffering from the hardening of the business environ-
ment. Unable to hold off icials responsible for their arbitrariness, greed, 
and incompetence, Chinese traders blame their Vietnamese neighbours 
for being either too smart or too stupid, too flexible or too stubborn. At 
the same time, the Chinese try to keep the appearance of goodwill and 
neighbourly amity, knowing all too well that without such performative 
reassurance, business across the border might not be feasible. This constant 
state of dilemma and anxiety is the undercurrent to the hustle and bustle of 
cross-border interactions, the shadow of the amicable surface of everyday 
life at the margin of the state.
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Good Neighbours, Bad Neighbours, Good Neighbours Again
In their three thousand years of existence in close proximity and of intense 
interactions, the southern frontier of the Chinese empire and the northern 
regions of the Vietnamese kingdom went through various kinds of rela-
tionships that compounded the neighbouring situation: kin, rival, tribute 
successions. While evolving together through a long history of peace and 
war, prosperity and famine, Vietnam has never been able to escape the 
Chinese influence, and China has never been able to dominate Vietnam. 
The close proximity and mutual influence that the two nations had on each 
other produced a state of co-existence characterized by asymmetric power 
relations (Womack 2006). Since early histories, the neighbouring relations 
between China and Vietnam have been variegated, encompassing, and 
subject to continual making and remaking.
When the communist movement brought China and Vietnam together 
in pursuit of a revolutionary future, neighbouring took on a particular 
meaning of brotherhood and comradery. As the ‘big brother’ in this relation-
ship, China supported Vietnam’s struggles against the French and then 
the Americans through military and material assistance. The Hekou-Lao 
Cai border, as one of the most important border ports between China and 
Vietnam, became a major pathway through which Chinese rice, corn, tex-
tiles, and weapons were brought to northern Vietnam. Meanwhile, China 
suffered the worst famine in modern history. Although millions died from 
starvation, Chinese aid to Vietnam did not stop. This deathly sacrif ice that 
many Chinese made, willingly or grudgingly, was for the grander purpose of 
supporting an ideal of communist unity in the region. A rhetoric of ‘helping 
a neighbour/brother’ was used by the Chinese state to justify its actions 
while people learned to ‘tighten their belts’ to help a neighbour in need.
In the Hekou-Lao Cai border, however, local Chinese benefited from be-
ing physically close to their neighbours as they had better access to food and 
supplies. Starvation was minimal as local Chinese and Vietnamese shared 
the aid they received and much of the limited resources that they had. 
Those who had endured this period of hardship in Hekou still remembered 
this time fondly – although people had very little, they were generous; as 
neighbours Chinese and Vietnamese helped each other out: ‘you gave me 
half bowl of rice, and I gave you a bunch of wild vegetables, that’s how we 
survived together’.
It was the simple faith that neighbours ought to help each other out that 
sustained borderlanders through diff iculties. When China declared war 
on Vietnam in the late 1970s it came as a shock to the locals. The building 
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up of animosity between these two countries was, in fact, gradual, lasting 
from the late 1960s to the 1970s. Before both states became openly hostile to 
one another, the rhetoric and performances of friendship and brotherhood 
continued to dominate. However, it was also during this period that strong 
suspicions and dissatisfactions started to grow. The leadership in China 
believed that they had lived up to the role of a ‘brotherly neighbour’ who 
never faltered when the Vietnamese were in deep crisis, and they expected 
respect and obedience in return. The Vietnamese suspected the Chinese 
attempt of domination and refused to become a puppet by seeking sup-
port from the Soviet Union instead. The Chinese leadership felt its ‘natural 
authority’ over Vietnam was defied and that blood and money had been 
spent for very little in return (Chen 1995). The Vietnamese gradually saw 
China as a new enemy because of its contempt and arrogance (Li 2007: 252). 
In the early 1970s, skirmishes along the China-Vietnam borders became 
more and more frequent. And on February 17th, 1979, the border war broke 
out. From then on, bloodshed and armed conflicts dominated the frontier 
zones. For the following ten years, the border was heavily militarized. Most 
borderlanders fled to inland regions in search of safety. Those who stayed 
continued to work as farmers, local guides, and civilian soldiers (minbing 
民兵) to help their troops with food, surveillance and local defence.
Borderlanders on both the Chinese and Vietnamese sides who stayed 
through the decade-long conflict found it diff icult to accept that their 
close neighbours could turn into enemies as many farmers were recruited 
to become armed civilian soldiers. The trust was ruined for those who 
could no longer tell whether their familiar neighbours were still innocent 
farmers or in fact merciless soldiers. One veteran in Hekou told me that 
when the war broke out he felt betrayed and hurt by the Vietnamese. He 
still had relatives and friends on the Vietnamese side who helped his family 
during the famine; but when conflicts intensif ied he became cautious of 
what he could say or do, for he was no longer sure if his acquaintances 
had already become Vietnamese spies. Now, in retrospect, he lamented 
that he must have been brainwashed into believing that his neighbours 
were ‘devils’ (guizi鬼子) in disguise. A few local businessmen in Hekou 
who experienced the terror of war told me that the worst was when they 
saw the dead bodies of people they knew, who were killed by landmines, 
or by Vietnamese neighbours who regarded these people as soldiers. ‘The 
Vietnamese are too close to us’, one local trader told me, ‘we have no place 
to hide if the Vietnamese were to launch an attack’.
Vietnamese borderlanders were equally weary of the border war. In fact, 
many of the Lao Cai residents still could not understand why the Chinese 
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declared war in the f irst place. One family that lived in Lao Cai for the 
past 30 years related to me their experience. The father used to be a farmer 
and continued to work on his f ields during the Chinese invasion. Prior to 
the war he traded his produce regularly with the Chinese and this helped 
feeding his family. When the war broke out his family had to hide in the 
mountains for a few days. Upon returning they found that their house had 
been burned town, and some of their friends killed during the invasion. The 
close proximity bred fatality when a good neighbour turned into an enemy.
The political and military tensions between China and Vietnam less-
ened considerably since 1986. This was also when other coastal regions 
and provincial capitals in China began to benef it from the nationwide 
economic reforms. With caution and nervousness, local residents in Hekou 
and Lao Cai also started bartering and trading with one another at the river 
banks and hidden mountain tracks. Soon, both governments off icially 
facilitated small-scale border trade at designated marketplaces even though 
diplomatic ties between China and Vietnam had not yet been resumed. 
Emphasizing on mutual help and local needs, trade was encouraged so 
that everyday commodities such as clothes, medicine, salt and sugar, and 
household utensils could be purchased. Since the 1990s, border trade soared 
after Hekou became an off icial ‘open border port’ (bianjing kaifang kou’an 
边境开放口岸) designated by the Chinese State Council, and started to 
enjoy favourable policies as a special economic zone. Since 2007, Hekou 
has been the biggest and most profitable border port in Yunnan province 
(Hekou Ministry of Commerce 2008). Local borderlanders took advantage 
of the ‘opening’ of the border and ventured into various kinds of businesses. 
Trade markets thrived as businessmen, investors, and tourists started to ar-
rive and explore new possibilities. As ‘doing business’ (zuo shengyi 做生意) 
dominated everyday cross-border interactions, Chinese and Vietnamese 
became once again friendly neighbours.
Performative Intimacy
Today, both the Chinese and the Vietnamese governments maintain that the 
prosperity of the boder speical zone relies heavily on friendship, cooperation 
and peace. These are cast as the foundation of mutual progress and good 
neighbouring. Starting from 2002, Chinese leadership off icially promoted 
its ‘Good Neighbour Diplomacy’ (mulin waijiao 睦邻外交) that promoted 
peace and stability, communication, and cooperation, and hoped that this 
could ease regional anxiety over China’s ‘rise’ in economic and military 
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power. In Southeast Asia, China has been particularly friendly towards 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as it aims to promote 
‘good neighbourly and friendly relations, increase high-level exchanges, 
and strengthen the mechanism of dialogue and cooperation in all areas to 
enhance understanding and mutual benefit’ (Chambers 2005: 16). However, 
suspicions and anxieties in Southeast Asian countries do not easily go away 
when China seems to repeatedly violate the thin trust that is built upon non-
binding bilateral agreements and business contracts. While Chinese leaders 
continue to join regional and international forums to promote dialogue 
and friendship, China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in flexing military 
muscles, particularly when it comes to territorial disputes, remains alarm-
ing for China’s neighbours. The South China Sea disputes in recent years, for 
example, demonstrates best the fragile nature of neighbourliness. As China 
signs action plans for strategic partnership with Vietnam, it also builds 
drilling platforms and other construction on the disputed Spratleys. While 
Vietnam strenuously protested against Chinese drilling and threatened 
an arbitration case at an international tribunal, it also has to emphasize 
the amicable relationship between two countries. While tensions over 
territorial disputes continue to cast shadows on China-Vietnam relations, 
friendship and good neighbourliness are also diligently performed.
Historically, for the Chinese, neighbouring entails a particular strategy 
of huairou (怀柔). James Hevia, when writing on imperial rituals and 
diplomacy of the Qing Empire, calls it ‘chershing men from afar’ (Hevia 
1995). Other scholars have pointed out that ‘cherishing’ may be too innocent 
a word as huairou indicates a distinct imperial attitude of pacifying barbaric 
nations through civilization and royal benevolence, so that these nations 
are willingly subservient to China’s power and influence (Esherick 1998, 
Zhang 1998). The acts of huairou are performed most ceremoniously through 
imperial rites and rituals when nations near and far sent their embassies to 
pay tribute to the emperor. In return, they received gifts and concessions 
for commerce.
In the long history of Sino-Vietnamese relations, Annam (northern 
Vietnam) had always been viewed as a loyal and submissive tributary 
state of the Chinese Empire, although China could rarely get its way in 
conflicts or in peace. John E. Wills recorded a telling incident in the Qing 
history (Wills 2001). In 1725-1728, the Qing imperial court had to send 
troops to the Yunnan-Annam frontier to deal with a substantial Annamese 
encroachment of bordering territories due to claims to a promising silver 
mine. When the king of Annam refused to give up his claim to this zone 
and amassed soldiers at the border, Emperor Yongzheng decided that the 
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territory was not worth f ighting for. The rivers and thick jungles made the 
frontiers nearly ungovernable, hill tribes were connected on both sides of 
the border, local lords were stubborn and powerful, and trade was taking 
place on unregulated markets and clandestine tracks. Giving the territory 
to Annam would be a grand gesture of huairou, as the Qing court hoped 
that Annam would be grateful to the generosity and benevolence of the 
emperor and remain loyal and submissive to the Qing rule. In the end, a 
great ceremony was held when the Annamese off icials received the royal 
edict conceding the territory. The matter was settled and neighbourly 
peace resumed.
Bradley Davis (2014) documented another episode of borderland 
anxiety and cooperative power brokering from 1874 to 1879 when the Sino-
Vietnamese frontier was under the rule of Vietnam’s Nguyen dynasty but 
in effect dominated by the Black Flags (heiqi jun 黑旗军) led by a Chinese 
military rebel Liu Yongfu. When the Black Flags, an armed rebel band from 
southern China, entered northern Vietnam as they fled purging from the 
Qing army, they quickly established an alliance with the Nguyen court by 
killing Francis Garnier, a French explorer who advocated colonial expansion 
and attempted to overthrow Nguyen rule in the Red River Delta. Liu Yongfu, 
already a powerful local lord in the lucrative trading town of Lao Cai, set 
up customs posts in the frontier and demanded a much higher duty on 
trans-border trade and charged additional fees on transport, inspection, 
protection, and permission to sell. The French consulate and the Nguyen 
off icials in Hanoi had to respect Liu’s lordship and sent envoys to negotiate 
terms of commerce along the Red River. While maintaining respect and 
civility during the negotiations, the French and Vietnamese secretly called 
Liu ‘an ignorant, unyielding, and mistrustful bandit who has lived by raping 
the mountains for these past twenty years’ and the Black Flags ‘the enemy 
of upland populations’ (Davis 2014: 67). Still, the Nguyen authorities had 
to rely on Liu’s army to keep peace and generate revenue through tax. In 
1878, Liu was even awarded a special bonus by the Nguyen court, a payment 
made to mark special events and meritorious service to the state. Liu and his 
personal militia also began to receive regular salaries and supplies directly 
from the Vietnamese court on a monthly basis. The endorsement of Black 
Flags as off icials enabled the Vietnamese court to maintain authority in 
areas beyond its administrative reach; at the same time, Liu and his armies 
were never to be trusted as they remained a vicious threat. Cooperative 
power brokering had to be entertained for the sake of frontier rule and 
profitability, even when anxiety and mutual distrust remained central to 
such an uneasy relationship.
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These incidents in the Sino-Vietnamese history point to the critical inti-
macy in a neighbouring relation when conflicts and distrust co-exist with 
performances of goodwill and fidelity. This inherent tension is unlikely to go 
away, as it continues to trigger caution and inspire greater efforts in making 
relationship work. The Sino-Vietnamese border conflict was another major 
incident in the history of these two neighbours when intimate ties broke 
down and had to be rebuilt again. But trust was not easy to f ind. Brantley 
Womack wrote about the lingering effect of distrust in his reflection of the 
asymmetric relations between China and Vietnam:
After the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, […] the 
disparity remained and grew more complicated. Now both countries 
were concerned about developing a peaceful relationship, but “off the 
record” and in concrete areas of confrontation, the Chinese disparaged 
the Vietnamese as unreliable, while the Vietnamese were alert to Chinese 
malevolent inscrutability and bullying. The attitudes were not simply 
the residual effects of previous hostility. The issues were the peacetime 
problems of border trade, bridges, rail connections, and so forth, not 
problems of history. But there was a continuity of roles. Vietnam tended to 
be overly sensitive to China’s actions, while China tended to be insensitive 
to the effects of its policies on Vietnam. (Womack 2006: xi)
If at the off icial level, such distrust is experienced subtly and expressed 
vaguely, at the local level, borderlanders who live in close contact have a 
more complicated view of neighbouring anxiety. On the one hand, past 
shadows of war and sabotage continue to haunt borderlanders, and the 
constant movement of traders, workers, tourists and other visitors at the 
trans-border marketplace makes any long-lasting relationship diff icult to 
maintain. On the other hand, trade and collaboration must go on as usual 
despite the underlying anxieties. The intimate relations borderlanders forge 
are always fraught with subterranean caution and uneasiness.
The Trade Fair and Its Unease
The Annual China-Vietnam Border Trade Fair was the brainchild of the 
Yunnan provincial government and China’s Ministry of Commerce. It is 
the f irst off icial trading function organized by local governments of Hekou 
and Lao Cai to consolidate China-Vietnam cross-border ties. The f irst Trade 
Fair was held in Lao Cai in December 2001, which was considered a huge 
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success by both local governments in terms of economic benefit and symbolic 
significance. Since then, the Trade Fair has grown considerably in scale and 
influence. High value commodities are traded at this event every year, and 
lucrative contracts sealing million-dollar deals are signed. For years, the Trade 
Fair has been a signature showcase of the economic (and diplomatic) success 
that an open economy can bring to the borderland. But the 2007 Trade Fair, 
as the vignette at the beginning adumbrates, ended on quite a different note.
On November 30th, 2007, when the Chinese traders and truck drivers were 
protesting in front of the Hekou Entry and Exit Inspection Center right next 
to the border gate, I joined my friends and went to see what was going on. 
The local police had already arrived and tried to separate the protestors 
from the spectators attracted by the commotion. Chinese traders were 
making their demands in unity and asking Hekou’s local authorities to 
act quickly and negotiate with the Vietnamese. If this matter could not be 
settled quickly, they claimed, the Hekou government as the main organizer 
of the Trade Fair should compensate the traders for their losses. Most of the 
traders protesting were not of familiar faces, and my local trader friends 
were simply watching the commotion without joining in. Later that day I 
met up with Weifen, a seasonal pineapple trader and tour guide who has 
been doing business in Hekou for over a decade. I asked him what was going 
on at the Trade Fair and he vented out his frustration:
This is why we always say that the Vietnamese are not trustworthy, not 
honest (bu kexin, bu laoshi 不可信不老实). You see what is happening 
now? We are right about them. We have this Trade Fair every year, but 
this kind of nonsense never happened before! Last year the Trade Fair 
was held in Hekou. These Vietnamese came over with their expensive 
redwood furniture, and earned several million dollars at the Fair. We did 
not tax them a single cent for their furniture, because the main purpose 
of this Trade Fair is to provide opportunities and a platform for traders. 
Who would have thought that the Vietnamese are playing dirty tricks 
this year?
After Weifen complained enough about the Vietnamese, he changed target:
Of course, Chinese traders are upset! It is understandable. But they are 
making a huge deal out of this now! They all gathered at the border mak-
ing a scene! Now the police have to go there. It is total chaos. How can 
these traders get what they want if they behave like this? In a situation 
like this, we Chinese should stick together. Why rile things up in our 
NeighbouriNg iN ANxieT y AloNg The chiNA-vieTNAM borDer 213
own home turf? We are f ighting amongst ourselves and the Vietnamese 
are getting away with their secret schemes (yinmou decheng 阴谋得逞). 
We are making a big scene here and they are laughing their teeth off 
watching us!
Embedded in Weifen’s indignation is a chronic frustration that local traders 
have with their Vietnamese neighbours. Even though many Chinese traders 
in Hekou have come to terms with the Vietnamese style of doing business 
(which, according to them, is characterized by short-sighted greediness and 
crude dishonesty), they were still surprised by this incident and claimed 
that they did not expect such a glaring breach of agreement to happen in 
a high-profile event like the annual Trade Fair.
This incident and the surprise experienced by Chinese traders shed 
light on the fragile foundation of neighbourly interaction. When the seem-
ingly harmonious border turns into a contested social space, the ‘radical 
Otherness’ (Žižek 2005) of the neighbour becomes visible and confront-
ing. It reminds those involved in the neighbouring situation that familiar 
cross-border encounters can be unpredictable. This incident shows that the 
rhetoric of ‘friendship’ and ‘harmony’ is not capable of preventing confronta-
tions and disruptions, and that the established order can be challenged 
without notice. Amidst the most amicable efforts to be good neighbours, 
suspicion lures, waiting to be confirmed (Žižek 1997).
For Hekou’s traders, this Trade Fair incident was but another indication 
that one should never take the smooth sailing of border interaction for 
granted. If the official bilateral agreement on duty-free trade can be violated 
arbitrarily without warning, one could hardly be confident that individual 
deals and arrangements made in the marketplace would be honoured. 
Although feeling self-righteous, Hekou’s traders had come to the realization 
that Hekou’s local government had very little weight in bargaining with the 
Vietnamese government and in defending Chinese interest. One the one 
hand, Chinese traders were upset that the Vietnamese were not punished; 
on the other, they were concerned that if such punishment did happen it 
might jeopardize future opportunities. Many indeed were aware that their 
fellow Vietnamese traders were also victims of the arbitrary levy imposed 
by Vietnamese off icials, but by blind anger and frustration they lashed out 
on all Vietnamese alike. Those who were new to cross-border trade could 
not do much except lament and indulge in wishful thinking that stern 
actions must be taken against the Vietnamese the next time around. Playing 
the hurt victim, they derived a particular sense of justice from excessive 
complaining. Others who had established deeper roots and enjoyed close 
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partnership with their Vietnamese counterpart also complained openly 
about Vietnamese dishonesty in the Chinese gathering, but they wasted 
no time in making quiet arrangements so that their goods could still make 
way to Vietnam via other, often illicit, routes.
Coping with Neighbouring and Bordering
What came as a surprise to traders in Hekou were not merely the conflicts 
that took place at the Trade Fair, but the confrontation of the unexpected 
in the familiar. They had to come to recognize their own vulnerability and 
limitations as they failed to rein in, or even to predict, this neighbourly 
‘otherness’. Slavoj Žižek in his Lacanian analysis of the ‘neighbour’ wrote 
about the peculiar ways in which one encounters a ‘neighbour’ – the fully 
subjectivized Other par excellence. The ‘neighbour’ is someone like ‘me’, 
‘my fellow human beings with whom I am engaged in the mirror-like 
relationship of competition, mutual recognition and so forth’ (Žižek 2005: 
143). Under normal circumstances, neighbourly interactions are predicated 
upon social norms, established rules of engagement, and expected cultural 
etiquettes that underpin such interactions. However, once in a while, the 
unexpected happens and familiar norms of engagement are def ied. This 
unexpected disruption reveals the precariousness and the fragility of 
neighbourly relations, as friendliness and courtesy can be ripped apart 
without warning as subterranean hostility comes to the surface. This is the 
moment when one is exposed to the ‘neighbour as the impossible Thing 
that cannot be gentrif ied’ (Žižek 2005: 143).
In an all too familiar way, the Chinese at the border re-enact a particular 
trope of ‘minority contact’ when they engage with the Vietnamese. Just 
as China’s minority subjects are often constructed as modernity’s Other 
(see e.g. Gladney 2004, Nyíri 2006, Schein 1997, 2000), some of the Chinese 
borderlanders and traders still harbor an impression that the Vietnamese 
are a ‘minority’ who should follow the Chinese lead in pursuit of frontier 
modernity. Many traders who visited Lao Cai likened this border town to 
a Chinese city ‘in the 1980s’, and compared the Vietnamese state of living 
to what the Chinese had already experienced in the past. They readily 
recognized the ‘semblant’, a familiar ‘mirror image’ of themselves personi-
fied by the Vietnamese, and relied on the Vietnamese reciprocal recognition 
to validate Chinese superiority.
When an unexpected incident took place, the Chinese illusion and 
the fragile nature of this imagined recognition was exposed. It came as 
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a telling moment when the Chinese were met with the potential threat 
of misrecognition they did not expect. When Weifen complained about 
the lack of unity of Chinese traders in crisis, he was imagining that the 
Chinese had become a laughing stock. This humiliating ‘laughter’ from 
the neighbour threatens to nullify the Chinese superior sense of self. The 
anxiety of being ‘laughed at’ is a constant source of potent paranoia at the 
border. A few traders related to me that they usually felt worst when their 
Vietnamese partners bragged about their own business savvy and laughed 
at Chinese gullibility. While the Vietnamese might be just joking about 
how naïve Chinese traders could be tricked into buying unmarketable 
commodities or overpriced products, Hekou’s traders took these jokes as 
insults. Although they were not amused, fake laughter and compliment 
on Vietnamese business skills had to be made, because they also wanted 
to sign contracts and secure friendship. ‘To survive one has to learn to 
make compromises’, a furniture trader in Hekou told me, ‘and you have 
to act as if you are on their side, and you agree with them even when you 
are offended by their stupid jokes’. ‘Some Chinese are indeed gullible’, he 
reasoned, ‘perhaps they are too eager to make a deal; but most of the time 
Chinese traders are just too trusting, or maybe they do not mind losing a 
little money to the Vietnamese as a deal sweetener’. His words, however, 
could not hide the frustration that he had to ‘sweeten’ business deals more 
than he was willing to, and his ‘generosity’ could still be misinterpreted as 
a sign of lacking business acumen.
On the second day of the Trade Fair, Boss Jiang, a trader dealing in toys, 
hosted a banquet for his local business partners and guests from Zhejiang 
province. Conversations at this banquet at f irst circled around the troubled 
Trade Fair. Soon, everyone at the table was complaining about doing busi-
ness with the Vietnamese. Boss Jiang talked about how he disliked the 
Vietnamese practice of doing business on credit (shexiao 赊销) instead 
of taking a loan from the bank, which would be the standard practice for 
most Chinese businessmen. Boss Jiang’s Vietnamese partners were used 
to ordering large quantities of toys but never paid in full. If they could 
successfully sell the products in Vietnam, the balance was then repaid. If 
the sales were poor, the Vietnamese either further delayed the repayment, 
or requested not to pay until the sales picked up. Boss Jiang had several 
experiences that some of his new Vietnamese clients just ran away and 
disappeared without paying him at all. The money lost in these deals were 
‘tuition fees’ ( jiao xuefei 交学费), Jiang said; but he’d rather lose money for 
the benefit of learning the ‘true nature’ (zhen mianmu 真面目) of some 
Vietnamese traders and valuing those who were trustworthy. The Trade 
216 JuAN ZhANg
Fair debacle was surprising, but he was not surprised what the ‘greedy 
Vietnamese’ would do to make a quick buck.
Boss Jiang’s local friends also admitted that the Vietnamese could still 
indulge in ‘backward’ ways of doing business, such as relying on credit, 
because they were spoiled by Chinese traders like themselves. As the 
market competition intensif ied, Chinese were even willing to take a loss 
to secure a deal and hopefully a long-term partnership. It was frustrating 
for these Chinese traders, because while they had very little confidence 
in Vietnamese credibility, they had to carry out business with them on an 
unreliable system of trust, verbal agreement, and personal credit. They still 
agreed that networks and mutual trust were important for trans-border 
businesses; they also complained that such a ‘trust’ was often not very 
trustworthy.
It is this tricky ‘neighbourly’ reality that demands a particular market 
(ir)rationality where Chinese businessmen seem to be willing to accept 
unreasonable conditions just to make sure that they are not cut out of the 
game and their partners across the border remain friendly. Some of the 
businessmen I know did not mind cutting down prices to a minimum, or 
even offering the Vietnamese the possibility to ‘borrow’ commodities f irst 
and pay later. Boss Ding, a vegetable trader originally from Guangdong in 
southern China, had to tolerate the practice where his Vietnamese clients 
could choose and pick from a truckload of fresh produce delivered to their 
doorsteps. The Vietnamese had the advantage to pay for only the best and 
freshest produce and rejected the damaged ones as a result of the long 
transit. Several other vegetable and fruit traders like him were doing the 
same thing. They were afraid that if they demanded their clients to pay for 
the full truckload, the Vietnamese would simply go away and use another 
supplier instead. Over the years, Boss Ding spent a great amount of money 
and energy into making sure that his long-term Vietnamese clients were 
happy and comfortable, so that he would keep his business going. He trusted 
his clients, and called them his ‘old friends’; but he also admitted that such 
a trust was high-maintenance work.
Another trader of fashion clothes, Boss Qin, who also came from Guang-
dong, usually gave free sample clothing to his Vietnamese partners to ‘test 
the market’. Prior to the Trade Fair, he was communicating with his partners 
about marketing a new design of jeans. He sent two thousand pairs free of 
charge to his partners and waited to hear the result of the sales. If the sales 
were good, the Vietnamese would pay him back. If the sales were poor, the 
Vietnamese would simply return the unsold jeans back to him. He had 
been doing this for quite a few years. His Chinese trader friends called 
NeighbouriNg iN ANxieT y AloNg The chiNA-vieTNAM borDer 217
him ‘cheap’ ( jian 贱), but he said that he had little choice. At f irst this was 
an effective gimmick to attract new Vietnamese trading partners; pretty 
soon Boss Qin realized that he could not stop doing this even if he wanted 
to. The Vietnamese were so used to his ‘friendly deals’ that they would not 
have it any other way. Boss Qin was naturally not happy with this situation; 
however, he became used to it and received his reward for this trusting 
gesture. His partnership with the Vietnamese retailer was strong, and they 
maintained a very amicable relationship that was helpful for business. The 
Trade Fair saga did not frazzle him, as he had never relied on trading events 
such as this to make his business work. His partners had reassured him that 
once the drama quieted down, they would pull strings and make sure that 
his jeans go through customs without paying additional taxes. Now he just 
needed to wait. Boss Qin told me that in crisis like this, good friends on the 
other side were truly helpful. While he always held reservations about his 
Vietnamese partners, when the unexpected happened he had no better 
way but to trust their promises.
The Vietnamese had their reservations too. One of Boss Qin’s partners, 
Mr Anh, a fashion retailer in Lao Cai, expressed his distrust against 
many Chinese traders he encountered. Having lived through the border 
war, during which time his father and uncles were enlisted as civilian 
soldiers, he saw the cruelty of Chinese soldiers burning down his house 
and other family properties. He loathed the Chinese for the invasion and 
for killing his fellow countrymen. When the border re-opened, he also 
saw opportunities to get rich when the Chinese brought in commodities 
that the Vietnamese needed. When cross-border trade just started, he 
remembered, the Vietnamese were sincere but the Chinese were schem-
ing – they brought in low-quality rubbish such as used plastic ware, old 
clothes, and second-hand white goods that no one wanted in China and 
sold these to the Vietnamese. Some Chinese traders were bullying the 
Vietnamese into accepting these low quality goods for a high price. ‘Even 
now the Chinese were not much better than before’, he told me in one 
of our gatherings, ‘their food was poisonous, their toys had lead, their 
soaps and lotions were full of harmful chemicals’. ‘If the Vietnamese were 
picky’, he reasoned, ‘it was because we had to be – we don’t want to sell 
low quality products to our customers’. He had been doing business with 
Boss Qin for over f ive years, and so far his trust over their partnership 
had not been compromised. He knew that Boss Qin would like to receive 
payment from him sooner; but he had to make sure that each batch of 
jeans he received was of good quality and was marketable. Until he had 
made sure by making a good prof it, he would be reluctant to repay Boss 
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Qin. Although they have been good friends for many years, Mr Anh said, 
‘One can never be too careful’.
Cross-border trade at the Sino-Vietnamese frontier is full of ordinary 
suspicions, mild arguments, subtle conflicts, and carefully maintained 
trust. These are embedded in the ‘agonistic intimacies’ (Singh 2011) of neigh-
bourly interactions. The façade of amicable relations and friendships is kept 
until the moment when the unexpected happens. When the normalcy of 
interactions is disrupted abruptly, the familiar social relations and practiced 
norms break down and prove to be inadequate and fragile.
The 2007 Trade Fair was one such moment when the Chinese traders were 
confronted by the very artif iciality of border norms, and f ind themselves 
still unsettled by unexpected confrontations. At f irst, nothing seemed to 
be a good enough solution to redress the situation. Two days into the Trade 
Fair saga, the Hekou Ministry of Commerce proposed a plan to appease the 
disgruntled Chinese traders. For those who travelled from other provinces to 
the border, each would receive a compensation of RMB 4,000 (approximately 
US$500) to cover transportation and incidental costs. A special trade zone 
was designated in Hekou’s new trading district as a substitute for the Trade 
Fair, where Chinese traders could do business amongst themselves. Chinese 
traders were still unhappy about this solution, claiming that they had 
travelled long and far to engage with the Vietnamese market, rather than 
trading with fellow Chinese. For many, the insult was acutely felt when they 
were rejected entry at the border gate. Regarding themselves as honoured 
guests and model entrepreneurs, they felt mistreated and disrespected.
At Hekou’s makeshift substitute trade zone, a sales representative of a 
famous regional winery in Yunnan expressed openly his indignation that 
what the Vietnamese did was a slap in the face. ‘This incident was of an 
international scale’, he declared to a small group of traders around him, 
‘and both the Chinese and Vietnamese central governments should take 
this matter seriously. The Vietnamese county government in Lao Cai was 
short-sighted, looking only for a quick income; and the Chinese county 
government in Hekou was weak and lacking strong muscles’. He suggested 
a strong retaliation the next time around. One man sitting at the next 
stall selling home entertainment systems stated that Hekou government 
should do something and show that China could not be easily bullied. ‘For 
example’, he suggested, ‘in 2008 when the subsequent Trade Fair takes place, 
China should deny entry to all Vietnamese companies. It would teach the 
Vietnamese who’s the boss’.
A week later, the 2007 Trade Fair ended quietly and most of the traders 
left town without further drama. The repercussions of this ‘international 
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incident’ were minimal. Although the 2007 Trade Fair did not receive com-
prehensive coverage in the local and provincial media (unlike in previous 
years), there were a few general reports on its success. The unpleasant 
conflicts disappeared completely in these reports. A month later, local 
traders in Hekou no longer took this incident seriously, as their deals still 
went through via various formal and informal channels. Peace and friend-
ship resumed in business relations as if the incident never took place. ‘It 
was diff icult for our Vietnamese partners too’, Weifen told me later on, 
‘and they also suffered loss like us. It was important to move on and not 
let this one incident damage our business’. Other businessmen were easy 
to forgive as well. They comforted themselves in thinking that a loss this 
time might bring prof it in the long run. By 2008, when the subsequent 
annual Trade Fair took place in Hekou, no retaliation was made as the Fair 
was most ceremoniously held. Over three hundred Chinese companies 
and 60 Vietnamese companies joined the Fair, generating over US$1 billion 
in revenue by trade and contracts (Hekou Ministry of Commerce 2008). 
Mitigating conflicts and letting go disputes is an essential skill in border 
living. This is a fundamental technique practiced for the benefit of intense 
everyday interactions and exchange. Since neighbours do not easily go away, 
unpleasant incidents are best forgotten.
The Business of Future
On the opening day of the 2007 Trade Fair, while the Chinese traders were 
protesting in anger at the border, a grand opening ceremony took place on 
a meticulously decorated stage in the main event venue in Lao Cai. Huge 
red banners were hanging on each side of the stage with words of goodwill. 
On the left, the banner read ‘friendly neighbours, all-round cooperation, 
long-term stability, future-oriented attitude’ (Mulin youhao, quanmian 
hezuo, changqi wending mianxiang weilai 睦邻友好, 全面合作, 长期稳定, 
面向未来). On the right, the banner read ‘good neighbours, good comrades, 
good friends, good partners’ (Hao mulin, hao tongzhi, hao pengyou, hao 
huoban 好睦邻, 好同志, 好朋友, 好伙伴). At the venue of the Trade Fair, 
however, rows after rows of empty booths were telling a different story. This 
emptiness rendered the ‘good neighbours, good friends’ rhetoric artif icial 
and hollow. This void, like a grim reminder of the unexpected moments of 
neighbourly unease, pointed to the foundational precarity at the heart of 
the neighbouring interactions.
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Figure 9.1  The 2007 Border Trade fair, Lao Cai
Juan Zhang, 2007
Figure 9.2  Empty Booths at the Trade Fair, Lao Cai
Juan Zhang, 2007
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It would be wrong, however, to understand this precarity as an intrin-
sic threat to the legitimacy and integrity of neighbouring at the border. 
Becoming and being neighbours cannot escape this precarity. The point 
of neighbourly unease is the motivation it brings in managing relations 
between those who live in close contact. As Chinese at the border talk 
anxiously about Vietnamese dishonesty, they eagerly aim to demonstrate 
how different they are from their ‘inferior’ neighbour by taking (albeit 
sometimes involuntarily and reluctantly) the ‘high ground’. The politics 
of differentiation are enacted when the Chinese aim to embody moral 
qualities of big-heartedness and generosity. Despite the performances, 
neighbouring unease does not go away quite easily. The point of unease is 
that neighbours are always reminded that friendship and surface harmony 
can be easily broken; and to make neighbouring work, compromises and 
strategies of pacif ication are necessary. Not unlike a localized practice of 
huairou, Chinese traders negotiate with the Vietnamese tactically and with 
care. Concessions and settlements are part of the neighbouring technique 
used to lubricate interactions and reduce friction; and grand ceremonies 
are always performed to mask tension.
In a sense, neighbourly unease is unexpectedly productive. The narrated 
distrust reveals that neighbouring relations need constant reinforcement. 
More efforts need to be invested in the celebration of harmony, mutual 
interest and a shared future of prosperity. Intimacies in trade relations are 
not devoid of doubts and suspicions. And traders on both sides (or at least on 
the Chinese side) are acutely aware that such doubts should be contained, 
tensions soothed, and mishaps forgiven. Neighbouring entails the ability 
to make compromises, to vet out frustrations, to forgive, and to move on.
The makeshift trading zone that was set up as a substitute of the 2007 
Trade Fair was a newly developed business district in Hekou. It was de-
signed to become a new face of the Hekou special economic zone. This 
zone, featured prominently by China’s Central Television in a program on 
‘Looking for gold in Hekou’ (Dao Hekou qu taojin 到河口去淘金), carries 
the promise of a prosperous future. When the Hekou government decided 
to use this new zone as the ideal location for the substitute Trade Fair, 
the intention was not only to solve the crisis at hand, but also to invite 
Chinese traders from interior regions to imagine the promising future of 
border trade in Hekou. Chinese traders were informed that the Red River 
Bridge, the third cross-border bridge between Hekou and Lao Cai, would 
be completed by 2009. By then, trucks would be able to take advantage of 
hassle-free border-crossing and swift inspections. A national new highway 
was constructed which could cut down travel time from Hekou to Kunming 
222 JuAN ZhANg
by half. Business in the zone would be completely duty-free being a special 
zone within a special zone.
By early 2011, these promises all became reality. The new bridge is now 
directing most of the cargo traff ic, and allowed trucks and passengers to 
clear customs ‘within seconds’ (Wang and Liu 2012). The new highway has 
cut down travel time considerably, although many truck drivers still prefer 
to go by old routes to save on toll fees. New border markets, condominiums, 
and shopping centres are changing the entire landscape of the new zone. 
Since 2007, annual Trade Fairs have been organized as planned, with each 
new one larger in scale and more profitable than the previous one. When 
I revisited Hekou in 2012, traders informed me that being friendly with 
Vietnam had indeed been a worthwhile effort. The 2007 Trade Fair debacle 
was just a minor setback in the process of all-round economic integration 
( jingji yitihua 经济一体化), not only between China and Vietnam but also 
China and the ASEAN market. The stage has been set. Those who know 
how to work with neighbours and share a vision of the future can best 
take advantage of what an opening border promises to offer, even though 
it may mean that they have to always live anxiously with their neighbours.
